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Beyond Russia’s ‘Versailles Syndrome’  
Patr i ck Nopens 
Russia alleges that at the end of the Cold 
War it underwent a soft version of a 
Versailles Treaty, pushing it into the 
periphery of global politics and cutting it 
out of European decision-making. The 
crisis in Ukraine is about the survival of 
Putin’s regime and the dismantling of 
the post-Cold War settlement. We should 
not accept the fallacious narrative of 
victimhood propagated by the Kremlin’s 
Versailles syndrome. Even so, it is time 
to explore practical ways of coexisting 
with Russia. The Helsinki Process and 
the disarmament and arms control 
agreements of the Cold War could serve 
as a model for a mutually acceptable 
security architecture. 
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The EU and NATO are ill-prepared to adapt 
to this threat: the EU’s lack of a coherent 
strategy for Eastern Europe has been exposed, 
and NATO forced to change its military 
posture.  
 
Until recently, the West considered Russia a 
partner that did not threaten European 
security. Now, Russia has adopted a complex, 
non-linear form of struggle. The West is being 
flooded with disinformation implying that the 
events in Ukraine are a legitimate response to 
slights Russia suffered after the Soviet Union 
imploded.  
 
In order to understand Moscow’s underlying 
motives and to refute the fallacious narrative 
Russia is disseminating, one has to enter 
Russia’s troubled psyche. 
 
THE CRISIS IN UKRAINE                                                                 
The war in Georgia was not a breaking point 
in relations between Russia and the West; it 
only took a couple of months to reset 
relations. The crisis in Ukraine, by contrast, is 
here to stay, because it concerns the future of 
Putin’s regime and the post-Cold War 
settlement. 
 
Firstly, the ousting of a leader supported by 
Russia and the establishment of democracy in 
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DON’T MENTION THE COLD WAR 
Russia’s violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and 
territorial integrity calls into question the 
foundations of the post-Cold War order.  
 
The NATO summit in Wales formalised this 
new phase in relations with Russia. It is, 
however, not yet clear whether this represents 
a fundamental shift or a less drastic adjustment 
towards a new balance in Europe. 
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Kyiv constitutes an existential threat to Putin’s 
regime. A real democracy in Ukraine, which 
shares so many historical and cultural ties with 
Russia, would set a dangerous precedent. It 
would demonstrate that a truly democratic 
system is possible in a country that inherited 
much of its political culture from the Russian 
empire and the Soviet Union, despite the 
conventional wisdom that such a country 
cannot be governed without a firm, autocratic 
hand. In this sense, the conflict over Ukraine 
has become a struggle for Russia. 
 
Secondly, the occupation of Crimea and the 
invasion of Eastern Ukraine call into question 
the post-Cold War settlement. Russia’s goal in 
the war in Georgia in 2008 was to end any 
further NATO enlargement into the former 
Soviet space. 
 
The EU reacted in 2009 with the Eastern 
Partnership initiative, which enabled six 
former Soviet republics to move towards the 
EU while avoiding the issue of EU 
membership. Georgia and Moldova signed up 
at the Vilnius Summit in November 2013. 
Ukraine had to wait until March 2014, when 
Yanukovych had been ousted. 
 
In 2010, the Russian Federation, Belarus and 
Kazakhstan formed the Eurasian Customs 
Union. In 2015, it will become the Eurasian 
Economic Union, with the addition of 
Armenia. However, without Ukraine, the 
Eurasian Union cannot achieve sufficient 
critical mass to form a separate Russian-led 
geopolitical entity, a precondition for Putin’s 
dream of a leading role for Russia in a 
multipolar world. 
 
Putin’s single-minded energy, which contrasts 
so sharply with Western foot-dragging, does 
not seem to have paid off for the time being. 
Ukraine has become the top prize in a zero-
sum game between the West and Russia. 
Moscow’s actions in Crimea and Eastern 
Ukraine have alienated Ukraine from Russia, 
forging Ukrainian nationhood. The Kremlin 
has had to scale back its hopes of 
incorporating the whole of Ukraine into the 
Eurasian Union, instead annexing Crimea and 
creating a frozen conflict in the Ukrainian 
Donbas. Ukraine has resolutely opted for a 
Western orientation, even though it will 
probably pay dearly, and joining the EU 
remains a far-off dream. 
 
DISENGAGEMENT 
The crisis in Ukraine in November 2013 
terminated the long process of disengagement 
form the West that started at the end of Putin’s 
first presidential term. The events in Ukraine 
should make it clear, even to the most 
optimistic or credulous, that the West’s 
relationship with Russia has become 
adversarial.  
 
During the first decade following the 
implosion of the Soviet Union, hopes were 
high for the integration of Russia into the 
West. Reforms would transform Russia into a 
democratic market economy. Russia did indeed 
become a member of most Western 
institutions. Most importantly, the Russia–
NATO Council gave Russia special status, and 
served as a forum where Russia could directly 
discuss security problems, as an equal, with 
NATO members.  
 
Although warnings about repeating the 
historical mistakes of the settlements after the 
First World War were rife, the West was not 
inclined to integrate Russia fully into European 
structures. It also ignored Russian concerns in 
the Former Yugoslavia.  
 
Putin tried to make a deal with the United 
States after 9/11. He immediately offered 
Russian support, most importantly ‘allowing’ 
the United States to use Central Asia to take 
the fight to Afghanistan. This signalled that he 
was prepared to accept America’s global 
leadership for the time being. On the other 
hand, he expected Russia to be treated as a 
 3 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
major ally with its own sphere of influence in 
the former Soviet space.1 America, however, 
had no intention of accepting Russian 
hegemony in the CIS. 
 
Disappointed by this rebuff, Russia sought 
rapprochement with Germany and France, 
joining them in opposing the war in Iraq in 
2003. This did not lead to a lasting 
convergence of interests with the EU. On the 
contrary, a second round of NATO 
enlargement in 2004 brought the Alliance to 
Russia’s doorstep.  
 
Shortly afterwards, the Revolution of Roses in 
Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in 
Ukraine brought pro-Western governments 
into power. Russia saw this as direct Western 
interference, triggering a lasting paranoid angst 
concerning foreign NGOs, which could one 
day support regime change in Russia. 
 
At the Munich Security Conference in 2007, 
Putin gave a pivotal speech laying out his 
frustrations with Western policy, and in 
particular NATO enlargement. 
 
At the summit in Bucharest in March 2008, 
NATO agreed that Georgia and Ukraine 
would become members of the Alliance some 
time in the future. However, their Membership 
Action Plans were postponed due to German 
and French opposition. Meanwhile, American 
Missile Defence plans in Europe were further 
souring relations with Russia.  
 
By the end of Putin’s second term, Russia had 
given up all hope of joining the West or even 
being associated with it as an independent 
partner. An enlarged NATO, the NATO 
Partnerships, the EU Eastern Partnership and 
Russia’s near abroad now overlapped 
considerably. Russia began looking for an 
alternative project where it could be a regional 
hegemon in the post-Soviet space. 
 
THE RUSSIAN NARRATIVE 
In order to ideologically underpin this shift 
away from integration with the West, Russia 
relies on a narrative lamenting Western 
exploitation of its weakness after the fall of the 
Soviet Union, and claiming leadership of a 
Russian cultural and geopolitical entity. 
 
Russia did not  lose  the Cold War 
Even though NATO’s armies did not invade 
and occupy Russia, to all intents and purposes, 
the Soviet Union did lose the Cold War. Its 
political and economic system imploded under 
its own contradictions and through 
competition with the West. 
 
According to Sergei Karaganov,2 Russia 
underwent a soft version of the Versailles 
Treaty, pushing it into the periphery of global 
politics and cutting it out of European 
decision-making. Russia considers current 
events in Eastern Europe as an indispensable 
step in undoing the outcome of the Cold War. 
 
According to the Russian narrative, the world 
has not treated Russia with the respect due to a 
great power since the end of the Cold War. For 
Russia, respect is not admiration for what a 
country has to offer, but fear of its military 
might. As Putin put it at his Valdai speech in 
2014:3 
 
‘Besides, we had such brilliant politicians like Nikita 
Khrushchev, who hammered the desk with his shoe at 
the UN. And the whole world, primarily the United 
States, and NATO thought: this Nikita is best left 
alone, he might just go and fire a missile, they have lots 
of them, we should better show some respect.’ 
 
No apolog ies  for  the Communist  past  
In contrast with Germany, Russia has never 
come to grips with the legacy of its past – the 
forced collectivisation, purges, and 
deportations of non-Russian minorities in the 
Soviet Union. Nor has Russia been prepared to 
accept any responsibility for the Soviet 
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repression in Central Europe that followed the 
Second World War. On the contrary, the 
Kremlin, if not entirely rehabilitating the Soviet 
regime, is downplaying some of its more 
unsavoury characteristics. The same goes for 
Stalin, whose ‘managerial qualities’  are being 
praised. 
 
The West humil iated Russia 
At the 25th anniversary symposium of the fall of 
the Berlin Wall, Gorbachev expressed Russia’s 
frustration as follows:  
 
‘Euphoria and triumphalism went to the heads 
of Western leaders. Taking advantage of Russia's 
weakening and the lack of a counterweight, they claimed 
monopoly leadership and domination of the world.’  
 
However, much of Russia’s humiliation was of 
its own making. The West supported Russia’s 
assumption of the Soviet Union’s seat on the 
United Nations Security Council. Russia joined 
the G8 even though it did not qualify as a major 
economy or democracy. The West helped 
transfer nuclear weapons from Belarus, Ukraine 
and Kazakhstan to Russia in exchange for Russia 
guaranteeing the borders of these countries.  
 
Western inter f erence caused the fa i lure o f  
pol i t i ca l  and economic re form  
The failure of political and economic reforms in 
Russia in the 1990s cannot be blamed on 
Western interference. Russia never sought to 
transform itself into a genuine democracy along 
the lines of Central European countries. This 
unwillingness to introduce real democratic 
reforms and the pillaging of state assets by a 
select few was in no way encouraged by the 
West. What is more, corruption has grown since 
Putin came to power. 
 
Furthermore, the stagnation of Medvedev’s 
modernisation drive is not the consequence of 
some Western plot. On the contrary, the West 
was prepared to assist with modernisation. Its 
abandonment was instead the result of a 
deliberate policy to keep the regime in place. 
The West never  intended to integrate  Russia 
into European structures  
After the Cold War, Russia hoped that NATO 
would be disbanded, and Russia would join 
Western institutions. These would transform 
themselves into new pan-European bodies in 
which Russia would be a leading member.  
 
Russia had hoped in vain to be able to 
influence NATO decision-making from within 
the NATO–Russia Council. Therefore, in June 
2008, Russia proposed a new European 
security architecture. In November 2009, 
Russia presented a draft treaty that the West 
rejected unanimously, because it would have 
given Russia a veto over Western decision-
making, and constituted a new Yalta.  
 
Furthermore, Russia was not able to exert 
much influence in other fields, even after 
joining the Council of Europe and, after a long 
period of waiting, the WTO.  
 
Therefore Russia believes that the post-Cold 
War international system only serves Western 
interests. In Europe, this led to a security 
system solely based on NATO and the EU. 
 
The West has double  s tandards 
Russia accuses the West of employing double 
standards when it comes to applying 
international law to the inviolability of national 
borders. This is remarkable when one 
considers that it took nine years before the 
first countries recognised Kosovo. Today it is 
recognised by 108 states. It took Russia 19 
days to annex Crimea and Sevastopol. Only six 
countries recognise this annexation. 
Furthermore, since the end of the Cold War, 
Russia has kept the frozen conflicts in Georgia 
and Moldova alive. 
 
NATO’s ‘broken promise ’  
One of the major issues that spoiled relations 
between the West and Russia was whether or 
not the West had given a commitment not to 
expand NATO eastwards. Russia considers 
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that the West formally did so as part of a deal 
over the reunification of Germany. Using 
recently declassified documents, Mary Elise 
Sarotte describes in Foreign Affairs how Russia 
might have been led to believe that such a 
commitment could have been acceptable to the 
West. Even though Kohl and Genscher, angling 
for Russia to green light German reunification, 
told their Russian counterparts that NATO 
would not expand to the East, a written promise 
was never made. More importantly, no other 
Western leader was prepared to go along with 
what Germany had put forward unilaterally.  
 
Surprisingly, in an interview on ZDF television 
on the 25th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, Gorbachev unequivocally stated that the 
issue of NATO enlargement was not discussed 
prior to the German reunification for the simple 
reason that the Warsaw Pact still existed.4  
 
Moreover, Russia contends that NATO 
undertook not to station foreign troops in new 
member states. The NATO–Russia Founding 
Act of 1997 does contain a statement regarding 
deployment of troops, but it is conditional:  
 
‘NATO and Russia do not consider each other as 
adversaries.  . . .  NATO reiterates that in the current 
and foreseeable security environment, the Alliance will 
carry out its collective defence and other missions by 
ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and 
capability for reinforcement rather than by additional 
permanent stationing of substantial combat forces.  . . .  
In this context, reinforcement may take place, when 
necessary, in the event of defence against a threat of 
aggression  . . .  Russia will exercise similar restraint in 
its conventional force deployments in Europe.’ 
 
Until 2014, NATO did not plan to deploy 
troops on the territory of ‘new’ members. Even 
now, none will be based permanently in Poland 
and the Baltic States, but will instead be 
continuously rotated. 
 
The decisions taken at the Summit in Wales 
concerning a Readiness Action Plan and a 
Spearhead Force are based on two arguments. 
Firstly, NATO has concluded that the Ukraine 
crisis has resulted in an adversarial relationship 
with Russia. Secondly, the Founding Act 
allows for reinforcements when necessary. 
 
The West wants to dismantle  Russia.  
In an interview in Novaya Gazeta, Nikolai 
Patrushev, the Secretary of the Security 
Council and former head of the Russian 
Federal Security Service or FSB, sheds light on 
the Russian obsession that the West is 
systematically attempting to dismantle the 
Russian Federation.5 Patrushev sees the 
Ukrainian crisis as a continuation of the 
American containment policy against the 
Soviet Union.  
 
By the beginning of the 1980s, America had 
decided to attack the Soviet Union’s 
vulnerabilities to provoke financial and 
economic bankruptcy. The collapse of the 
price of oil, coupled with an increase in 
military expenditure due to the war in 
Afghanistan, the rising tensions within Warsaw 
Pact member states and a renewed arms race, 
provoked a profound economic crisis, which 
had far-reaching political and ideological 
repercussions.  
 
Following the Cold War, the West, according 
to Patrushev, took advantage of Russia’s 
impotence to realise its long-term goal of 
bringing the Balkans within its orbit by 
breaking up Yugoslavia. 
 
The West then moved on to dismember the 
Russian Federation. According to Patrushev, 
the West actively supported the separatists in 
Chechnya, ‘which declared its independence 
and was temporarily under effective control of 
the West.’  
 
According to this logic, the West caused the 
crisis in Ukraine on purpose. The objective 
once again is to provoke Russia into stepping 
up its defence expenditure and undermining its 
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economy through sanctions.  
 
The West i s  support ing reg ime change 
From the Russian point of view, the Revolution 
of the Roses in Georgia in 2003, the Orange 
Revolution in Ukraine in 2004 and the Tulip 
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in 2005 unmistakably 
point to the West’s encouragement of regime 
change. This backing is not limited to the post-
Soviet space, as is demonstrated by the wars in 
Iraq, Libya and Syria. 
 
What the Kremlin fears most is regime change 
in Russia, fermented by foreign influence. Its 
reactions to the protests in 2011 and 2012, the 
clampdown on the internet, and the measures 
taken against NGOs labelled as foreign agents, 
all point to this unease with external influences. 
Therefore, the Maidan movement is depicted as 
a fascist junta, ousting a democratically elected 
head of state.  
 
Ukraine should not be allowed to succeed in any 
democratic experiment because this would 
undermine the Kremlin hold on power in 
Russia. Therein lies the vital contradiction 
between the goal of trying to integrate Russia 
into European civilisation, and the survival of 
the present political system in Moscow.  
 
The West i s  encroaching on tradi t ional  
Russian spheres  o f  in f luence  
According to Russia, NATO and the EU are 
encroaching on the Soviet Union’s traditional 
post-Second World War sphere of influence in 
Europe. Russia contends that the United States 
provided direct support for Georgian attacks 
against Russian citizens and peacekeepers in 
2008. 
Through the war in Georgia, Russia tried to 
make it clear that Ukraine joining NATO would 
be considered a casus belli.  
In 2013, the West supported what the Kremlin 
considers a coup d’état in Kyiv, directly 
threatening Russia.  
The r ight to protec t  Russians anywhere  
The disintegration of the Soviet Union split up 
its three Slavic components, leaving a third of 
the Slavic population outside Russia. Without 
Ukraine and Belarus, Russia does not possess 
the indispensable demographic base to 
compete with the United States, the EU, 
China, or other upcoming powers. Hence the 
unacceptability for Russia of these countries 
drifting towards the West, and the urgency of 
consolidating a union of some sort. 
 
Moreover, 25 million ethnic Russians got 
stranded in former Soviet states. Even though 
Russia views these states as part of the Russian 
historical space, it also considers it its duty to 
protect its ethnic kin.  
 
What is more, Russians interpret this duty very 
broadly. Already in 1994, Putin declared that 
‘Territories, which are impregnated by Russian 
or Slavic blood, have a right to remain forever 
in Slavic possession.’6 In his speech in the 
Kremlin on 18 March this year, Putin once 
again linked territory with the past and with 
spilt Russian blood.  
 
This view of a broader Russian world is not 
limited to the Slavic components of the former 
empire. In July this year, at a meeting with 
Russian ambassadors in Moscow, Putin 
extended this duty of protection not only to 
ethnic Russians, but equally to everyone who 
feels they belong to the Great Russian World:  
 
‘When I speak of Russians and Russian-speaking 
citizens I am referring to those people who consider 
themselves part of the broad Russian community, they 
may not necessarily be ethnic Russians, but they 
consider themselves Russian people.’ 
 
Seen in the light of the Ukraine crisis, this 
rhetoric is beginning to worry some of Russia’s 
neighbours, especially Kazakhstan with its 
large ethnic Russian minority. The fact that 
Russia, as one of the guarantors of Ukrainian, 
Belorussian and Kazakh sovereignty and 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
 7 
independence in the Budapest Memorandum of 
1994, does not feel bound by its obligations 
towards a new government in Kyiv, is not 
reassuring for Nazarbayev’s or Lukashenko’s 
successors.  
 
Russia as guardian o f  a Russian–Eurasian 
c iv i l i sat ion 
In the Russian view, civilisations are the 
foremost entities of geopolitics. Russia, as the 
leader of the Russian–Eurasian civilisation, has 
to counteract the onslaught of global colour 
revolutions incited by the Atlantic civilisation. 
Russia’s holy mission is to preserve the Russian 
civilisation and to fight Western moral 
decadence.  
 
Russia’s contention that its conservative 
orthodox values will save European and 
Christian civilisation contrasts sharply with the 
lack of values in Russian society. Indeed, 
Moscow and the other main cities are notable 
for their decadence, the whole country for its 
corruption.  
 
A MUTUAL LACK OF UNDERSTANDING 
It undoubtedly is true that there is a lack of 
understanding in the West about Russia. Since 
the end of the Cold War, the West has focussed 
on other problems, losing touch with 
developments in Russia. There is, however, a 
tendency is some quarters, under the guise of 
expertise, to accept all that is put forward in 
Russia’s narrative.  
 
However, the opposite also applies. Russians 
have little insight into how Western democracies 
work. Autocratic regimes all too quickly focus 
on slow decision-making at national and 
multinational levels, as in NATO and the EU. 
They do not realise that, even if it takes time, 
once Western democracies do decide to get 
involved, one should not underestimate their 
determination.  
 
Neither does Russia understand the resentment 
in Central Europe against the Soviet occupation, 
which resulted in hundreds of thousands being 
executed and deported, as well as setting back 
the development of political and economic 
freedom by 45 years.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
We should not accept the fallacious narrative 
of victimhood propagated by the Kremlin’s 
Versailles syndrome. Nor should we go along 
with Russia’s superpower hangover, whose 
only remnants seem to be nuclear weapons. 
 
Russia wants respect. Perhaps the best way to 
earn this would be by developing its soft 
power, not through a mixture of Soviet, 
nationalistic and ethnic nostalgia, but by 
making the country politically and 
economically attractive.  
 
Russia’s real problem is that it remains steeped 
in a Cold War attitude, replaying the Brezhnev 
doctrine, in which smaller countries are not 
allowed to chart their future. 
 
Russia apologists – some would call them 
‘useful idiots’ – make the leap from 
understanding Russia’s frustrations to taking 
them at face value. This is not helpful if one is 
trying to analyse events objectively, but it does 
lend the Kremlin a helping hand in spreading 
its message. 
 
RECOMMENDATION: HOLD OUT, HOLD 
OFF, HOLD IN 
The West has to hold out, not only against 
actions in Ukraine but also against Russia’s 
narrative. This means not accepting the 
annexation of Crimea or the invasion of 
Eastern Ukraine as a fait accompli, but instead 
actively countering the Kremlin’s information 
war.  
 
Fending off Russian adventurism means first 
of all recognising that Russia poses a real 
threat to peace in Europe, and not only 
Ukraine. Russia will continue to attempt to 
undo the setbacks it suffered in Ukraine. First 
 




and foremost it cannot accept the success of a 
pro-Western government. Secondly, if Russia 
cannot annex the Ukranian Donbas and a land 
corridor to Crimea, it will support autonomy, 
which is a euphemism for a frozen conflict. 
Thirdly, success in Ukraine risks emboldening 
Russia. Peace in Europe depends, therefore, on 
showing resolve and striking a fine balance 
between deterrence and diplomacy. 
 
Finally, in order to either contain Russia or bring 
it back into a European security system, the 
West and Russia have to find ways of defusing 
the crisis and rebuilding a partnership based on 
mutually accepted rules. Toning down the 
oratory and turning up diplomacy should be a 
first step. Revamping the Helsinki Process and 
the disarmament and arms control agreements 
of the Cold War would also make a good 
starting point for channelling geopolitical 
competition. However, a broader agreement is 
necessary. Even Medvedev’s proposal for a 
New Security Architecture in Europe could 
provide some ideas, as long as it does not lead 
to a new Yalta and does not give Russia a veto 
over NATO or EU decisions. This is not the 
equivalent of trying once again to integrate 
Russia into the West. It is about coexisting 
with Russia, taking account of Russia’s real 
geopolitical and geoeconomic weight, and not 
Russia’s delusions about a ‘Russian world’. 
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